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ASSESSING POTENTIAL RADIOLOGICAL HARM TO FUKUSHIMA 
RECOVERY WORKERS
Bobby R. Scott  Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute
 A radiological emergency exists at the Fukushima Daiichi (Fukushima I) nuclear
power plant in Japan as a result of the March 11, 2011 magnitude 9.0 earthquake and the
massive tsunami that arrived later. News media misinformation related to the emergency
triggered enormous social fear worldwide of the radioactivity that is being released from
damaged fuel rods. The heroic recovery workers are a major concern because they are
being exposed to mostly gamma radiation during their work shifts and life-threatening
damage to the radiosensitive bone marrow could occur over time. This paper presents a
way in which the bone marrow equivalent dose (in millisieverts), as estimated per work
shift, could be used along with the hazard function model previously developed for radi-
ological risk assessment to repeatedly check for potential life-threatening harm
(hematopoietic system damage) to workers. Three categories of radiation hazard indication
are proposed: 1, life-threatening damage unlikely; 2, life-threatening damage possible; 3, life-threat-
ening damage likely. Categories 2 and 3 would be avoided if the whole body effective dose
did not exceed the annual effective dose limit of 250 mSv. For down-wind populations,
hormetic effects (activated natural protective processes) are much more likely than are
deleterious effects.
Key Words: radiological emergency, risk assessment, hormesis
INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck near Sendai,
Japan and was followed one hour afterwards by a massive tsunami. The
earthquake was the largest in the country’s history, causing massive prop-
erty damage (including the Fukushima nuclear power facility) and the
loss of thousands of lives. Although the six nuclear reactor units at the
Fukushima Daiichi (Fukushima I) power plant apparently withstood the
9.0 magnitude earthquake, the tsunami carried away the fuel tanks for
the power plant’s emergency diesel generators. The generators provided
back-up power for the pumps used for removing heat from the radioac-
tive fuel.
Three of the reactors (Units 1, 2, and 3) were operating and they
automatically shut-down when the earthquake occurred, as designed.
The other reactors (Units 4, 5, and 6) were already shut down for routine
maintenance. Thus, after the earthquake all six reactors were in shut-
down mode.
Address correspondence to Bobby R. Scott, Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute, 2425
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The earthquake disabled normal electrical power and the tsunami
incapacitated backup electrical power. This created a problem for con-
tinued cooling of the fuel inside each reactor pressure vessel and in the
associated used-fuel pool (water) located in its’ reactor building. The
pressure vessels serve to prevent the release of fission-product radionu-
clides to the environment. Some of the water boiled away and some of the
fuel was damaged. Unfortunately, the loss of electricity also led to pro-
duction of hydrogen (due to the radiolysis of water and possibly the
chemical reaction of water with the hot zirconium fuel cladding). Several
of the reactor buildings were damaged when hydrogen ignited causing
explosions inside and radioactivity (fission-product radionuclides) was
released to the environment.
The events at Units 1, 2, and 3 were rated as Level 7 (major release of
radioactive material with widespread health and environmental effects
requiring implementation of planned and extended countermeasures)
on the International Nuclear Event Scale and those at Unit 4 were rated as
Level 3 (serious incident).
There were three casualties related to the earthquake and tsunami. A
crane operator was killed during the earthquake and two workers were
found dead in one of the turbine buildings after the tsunami. It is pre-
sumed that the two workers drowned during the tsunami. Of the approx-
imate 300 people at the Fukushima Daiichi site, 28 have accumulated
effective radiation doses of more than 100 millisieverts (mSv) as of April
15 (IAEA 2011). The workers wear protective clothing and equipment
(including respirators) as their work continues to bring the reactors and
used fuel pools toward a stable cooling condition which would help miti-
gate the release of radioactive materials.
A target of about three months was set on April 17, 2011 to reduce the
radiation exposure rate (Step 1) at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Step 2
involves controlling the release of radioactivity and significantly sup-
pressing the radiation exposure level and is expected to be achieved
three to six months after completion of Step 1.
During each work shift, the workers are exposed over their total bod-
ies to penetrating gamma rays. Their effective doses are monitored and
recorded in units of millisievert. The worker effective dose limit was
recently raised to 250 mSv in one year.
Recent air measurements in the area to the east of the No. 3 reactor
and building had levels up to 70 mGy per hour. The indicated building
was damaged by a hydrogen explosion on March 14, 2011. Uniform expo-
sure of the whole body for four hours to gamma rays at the indicated rate
would exceed the 250 mSv limit (Katori and Tsuboya 2011).
For assessing potential harm from radiation deterministic effects such
as potential life-threatening damage to the radiosensitive bone marrow,
estimates of the average radiation absorbed dose in units such as gray
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(Gy) to the target organ are needed. Because the radiation weighting fac-
tor for gamma rays is 1, an equivalent dose in millisieverts to the bone
marrow is the same numerical value as the bone marrow absorbed dose
in milligrays (mGy).
This paper provides risk-assessment tools for evaluating the potential
for life-threatening harm to emergency workers at Fukushima Daiichi
facility from the cumulative gamma-ray exposures over multiple work
shifts. The tools are based on the hazard-function (HF) model (Scott et al.
1988, 1998; Scott and Hahn 1989; NRPB 1996; Scott 2004, 2005, 2009;
IAEA 2005), which was developed for assessing the risk of harm from
deterministic effects (i.e., threshold effects) of high-level radiation expo-
sure and allows for taking into consideration variation in the average dose
rate to bone marrow over different work shifts. The model is based on
extensive review of available data (animals and humans) and has been
tested in laboratory animal models and subjected to high-level peer
review (Scott and Hahn 1989). The focus on bone marrow is because its
severe damage (massive stem cell killing) poses the largest life-threaten-
ing risk for circumstances of total-body exposure to gamma rays.
Avoidance of life-threatening damage to bone marrow would be expect-
ed to also avoid life-threatening damage to other more radioresistant
organs.
HAZARD FUNCTION MODEL AND NORMALIZED DOSE
The hazard function (HF) model has been used to characterize risk
for deterministic health effects from complex irradiation patterns that
arise during radiological emergencies (IAEA 2005). Here the focus is on
external whole-body exposure of humans to gamma rays during the cur-
rent Japanese radiological emergency.
The simplified form of the HF model described below relates specifi-
cally to life-threatening damage to bone marrow. The more general form
(Scott and Hahn 1989, NRPB 1996, IAEA 2005) addresses damage to mul-
tiple organs with a focus on evaluating the risk of lethal damage for com-
peting modes of lethality (e.g., hematopoietic, gastrointestinal, and pul-
monary).
With the form of the HF model as presented here, the risk Rhem(X) for
life-threatening damage to bone marrow (hematopoietic damage) is
related to the corresponding hazard function, Hhem(X), through the equa-
tion:
(1)
The independent variable X is called the normalized dose and has
units of LD50 (i.e., median lethal dose). Thus, X=1 corresponds to an LD50
R X H Xhem hem( ) exp= − − ( )( )1
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absorbed radiation dose. Hhem(X) is given by the following equation (Scott
and Hahn, 1989):
(2)
The normalized dose X is given by the following:
(3)
The parameter T is the total exposure time. The variable y(z) is the
average (spatially) dose rate at exposure time t=z, and V is the shape
parameter. D50(y(z)) as used here is the dose-rate-dependent LD50
expressed as a bone marrow absorbed dose (usually expressed in Gy).
Although the integral in Equation 3 is evaluated over the total exposure
time T, it can be partitioned to cover each daily work shift, with y(z)
replaced by the average dose rate yj to bone marrow for the jth
(j=1,2,...,n) work shift. In this case the cumulative normalized dose X is
the sum of the respective, shift-specific normalized doses X1, X2, ..., and
Xn (Scott et al. 1998). The indicated partitioning over work shifts is valid
because normalized doses between work shifts are zero.
The dose-rate-dependent function D50(y), evaluated separately for
each work shift (i.e., y = yj), is based on the following empirical equation
with a fixed dose rate y (Scott and Hahn 1989; NRPB 1996):
(4)
As can be seen from the construct of Equation 4, D50(y) decreases as
y increases and approaches an asymptotic value θ
∞
at very high dose rate.
This feature of the D50(y) as it relates to continuous exposure has been
called the Ainsworth phenomenon (Scott 2009), in honor of John
Ainsworth who first reported the feature (Ainsworth et al. 1964). Prior to
the realization of the Ainsworth phenomenon, it was widely thought that
D50(y) would approach zero at very high dose rates.
Simulated values for D50 vs. fixed dose rate for different mammalian
species are presented in Figure 1, based on a previous publication in this
journal (Scott 2009). The term (θ1/y) accounts for the steep rise in D50(y)
above θ
∞
as dose rate decreases to very low values. For life-threatening
damage to the bone marrow under circumstances where no medical
countermeasures (mitigating medical procedures) are employed, the
central estimate of the indicated HF model parameters for humans are θ
∞
= 3 Gy and θ1 = 0.07 Gy2/h when the dose rate is in Gy/h (Scott 2004).
Subjective lower and upper bounds for θ
∞
are 2.5 and 3.5 Gy, respective-
ly. Subjective lower and upper bounds for θ1 are 0.06 and 0.08 Gy2/h,
respectively (Scott and Hahn 1989).
H X Xhem
V( ) = ( )[ ]ln 2
X y z D z dz
T
= ( ) ( )[ ]∫ / 50
0
D y y50 1( ) = ( ) + ∞θ θ/
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The indicated value of 3 Gy for θ
∞
is less than the implied corresponding
values of 4 and 5 Sv sometimes stated in the news media as the LD50 for
humans. Firstly, the value of 3 Gy (for bone marrow) is based on exten-
sive research (Scott and Hahn 1989) and is consistent with the value
found for people residing inside reinforced concrete buildings in
Nagasaki, Japan after the atomic bombing (Levin et al., 1992). Secondly,
the LD50 should not be stated in units of sievert, especially when derived
from data for mixed high- and low-LET radiations or high-LET radiation
only because the radiation weighting factors used to obtain equivalent
dose in sieverts are inappropriate for deterministic effects (NRPB, 1996;
IAEA 2005).
The work-shift-specific normalized doses X1, X2, ..., and Xn for a given
worker can be evaluated based on estimates of the shift-specific average
radiation dose to bone marrow and the length of the work shift in hours.
If Y1, Y2, ..., and Yn are respective estimates of the gamma-ray doses to
bone marrow (which are here approximated by corresponding bone mar-
row equivalent doses evaluated with a radiation weighting factor of 1),
then dividing bone marrow doses by the total time on each correspon-
Assessing potential radiological harm
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FIGURE 1. Predicted median lethal dose (D50(y)) for the hematopoietic mode of death for different
mammals (Sprague-Dawley rats, white non-inbred mice, dogs, swine, goats, sheep, and humans) as a
function of the external low-LET radiation dose rate y to bone marrow in Gy/h. Dose rate is pre-
sented as a categorical variable and is not aligned to tick marks. 
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ding shift gives estimates of the average dose rates y1, y2, ..., and yn to bone
marrow over each shift for a given individual. The normalized dose Xj to
bone marrow for the jth shift can then be evaluated using the following:
(5)
Table 1 gives central estimates of Hhem(X) and Rhem(X) as a function of
the cumulative normalized dose X for life-threatening injury to the
hematopoietic system after whole-body gamma-ray exposure. Column 4
of the table gives radiation hazard (RADHAZ) indications for gamma-irradi-
ated individuals that fall into the following three RADHAZ categories that
depend on the value for Hhem(X):
0 ≤ Hhem(X) < 0.003: life-threatening damage unlikely (RADHAZ low);
0.003 ≤ Hhem(X) < 0.1: life-threatening damage possible (RADHAZ
moderate);
Hhem(X) ≥ 0.1: life-threatening damage likely (RADHAZ high).
X Y D yj j j= ( )/ 50
B. R. Scott
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TABLE 1. RADHAZ indication for monitoring for potential life-threatening hematopoietic damage
caused by whole-body, gamma-ray exposure.a
X Hhem(x) Rhem(x) RADHAZ Indication
≤ 0.4 0 0 life-threatening damage unlikely
0.5 1.08E-02 1.08E-02 life-threatening damage possible
0.6 3.23E-02 3.18E-02 life-threatening damage possible
0.7 8.15E-02 7.83E-02 life-threatening damage possible
0.8 1.82E-01 1.66E-01 life-threatening damage likely
0.9 3.68E-01 3.08E-01 life-threatening damage likely
1 6.93E-01 5.00E-01 life-threatening damage likely
1.1 1.23E+00 7.07E-01 life-threatening damage likely
1.2 2.07E+00 8.74E-01 life-threatening damage likely
1.3 3.35E+00 9.65E-01 life-threatening damage likely
1.4 5.22E+00 9.95E-01 life-threatening damage likely
1.5 7.90E+00 1.00E+00 life-threatening damage likely
1.6 1.16E+01 1.00E+00 life-threatening damage likely
1.7 1.67E+01 1.00E+00 life-threatening damage likely
1.8 2.36E+01 1.00E+00 life-threatening damage likely
1.9 3.26E+01 1.00E+00 life-threatening damage likely
2 4.44E+01 1.00E+00 life-threatening damage likely
aX, cumulative normalized dose; Hhem(X), HF for life-threatening hematopoietic damage; Rhem(X),
risk of life-threatening hematopoietic damage. The lower bound on the threshold is X = 0.4 based on
10,000 Monte Carlo calculations with triangular distributions (lower bound, central estimate, upper
bound) for the threshold absorbed dose (1.2 Gy, 1.5 Gy, 1.8 Gy) and for the LD50 (2.5 Gy, 3 Gy, 3.5
Gy) for high-rate exposure to gamma rays (Scott and Hahn 1989).
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The subjective RADHAZ indications apply irrespective of whether a
person received medical countermeasures (i.e., medical support) or not.
However, application of medical countermeasures for external gamma-
ray exposure will impact on the value for the cumulative normalized dose
X (Scott 2005). This can be addressed by dividing X by the appropriate
protection factor (PF) (Scott 2005) associated with the countermeasures
employed [e.g., administration of a radioprotector and/or providing sup-
portive medical treatment (IAEA 1988; AFRRI 1997)]. The new value of
X would then be used to evaluate Hhem(X) and Rhem(X). This approach is
equivalent to increasing the D50 (Equation 4) by a fixed PF.
Table 2 shows the potential significant impact that application of
medical countermeasures could have on the resultant RADHAZ indica-
tion that is assigned. Results are for a hypothetical set of countermeasures
leading to a PF of 2. Each value of X in Table 1 was divided by 2 and
Hhem(X) was recalculated (Table 2). As implied, providing medical sup-
port to heavily irradiated emergency workers would be expected to have
significant life-saving benefits, as is already well known.
Table 3 gives estimates (central) of Xj for a given value of yj for a 1-
hour-exposure shift, which facilitates application of the risk assessment
framework presented here. The values of yj range from 1 mGy/h to100
mGy/h. As an example of application of Table 3, consider the hypotheti-
cal case where a worker has undergone 10 consecutive days of work at the
Fukushima Daiichi plant, working 10-h shifts per day. For this example
the 10-shift, bone marrow equivalent doses (based on radiation weighting
factor =1) are given by Y1
* = 1 mSv, Y2
* = 2 mSv, Y3
* = 4 mSv, Y4 
*= 2 mSv,
Y5
* = 3 mSv, Y6
* = 3 mSv, Y7
* = 2 mSv, Y8
* = 3 mSv, Y9
* = 3 mSv, Y10
* = 1 (total
= 24 mSv). These equivalent doses Yj
* are used as estimates of the average
absorbed radiation doses Yj to bone marrow. Thus, changing the unit to
mGy and dividing by 10 h (length of each work shift) yields the corre-
Assessing potential radiological harm
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TABLE 2. Expected impact of medical countermeasures on results in Table 1 when PF=2. 
Modified X Hhem(X) RADHAZ Indication
≤ 0.4 0 life-threatening damage unlikely
0.45 5.76E-03 life-threatening damage possible
0.5 1.08E-02 life-threatening damage possible
0.55 1.92E-02 life-threatening damage possible
0.6 3.23E-02 life-threatening damage possible
0.65 5.23E-02 life-threatening damage possible
0.7 8.15E-02 life-threatening damage possible
0.75 1.23E-01 life-threatening damage likely
0.8 1.82E-01 life-threatening damage likely
0.85 2.61E-01 life-threatening damage likely
0.9 3.68E-01 life-threatening damage likely
0.95 5.10E-01 life-threatening damage likely
1 6.93E-01 life-threatening damage likely
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sponding values for the work-shift-specific average dose rates to bone
marrow: y1 = 0.1 mGy/h, y2 = 0.2 mGy/h, y3 = 0.4 mGy/h, y4 = 0.2 mGy/h,
y5 = 0.3 mGy/h, y6 = 0.3 mGy/h, y7 = 0.2 mGy/h, y8 = 0.3 mGy/h, y9 = 0.3
mGy/h, and y10 = 0.1 mGy/h.
Results for this hypothetical exposure scenario where no medical
countermeasures are provided are presented in Table 4. Both 1-h and 10-
h normalized doses X are presented with the 10-h results being 10 times
the 1-h results. Thus, for a 5-h shift, the results would have been 5 times
the 1-h results. The calculated cumulative normalized dose X for the ten
10-h shifts was 8.3x10-3, which is below the threshold lower bound of 0.4
(Table 1) for life-threatening damage. The bound corresponds to the 10th
percentile of the uncertainty distribution for the threshold obtained via
Monte Carlo calculations (10,000 realizations) based on triangular distri-
butions for the threshold and LD50 doses (see footnote in Table 1). For X
= 8.3x10-3, the corresponding value for Hhem(X) is therefore 0 (Table 1),
although a meaningless value of ln(2)[8.3x10-3]6 which is 2.3x10-13
(rounded) can be calculated. For the indicated value for X, the RADHAZ
B. R. Scott
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TABLE 3. Central estimates of normalized dose hourly increment Xj for life-threatening injury
from the hematopoietic mode as a function of the hourly-averaged gamma-ray dose rate to bone
marrow in mSv/h when no medical countermeasures are applied.a
mGy/h Xj mGy/h Xj mGy/h Xj mGy/h Xj
1 1.4E-05 26 4.6E-03 51 0.012 76 0.019
2 5.3E-05 27 4.8E-03 52 0.012 77 0.020
3 1.1E-04 28 5.1E-03 53 0.012 78 0.020
4 2.0E-04 29 5.4E-03 54 0.013 79 0.020
5 2.9E-04 30 5.6E-03 55 0.013 80 0.021
6 4.1E-04 31 5.9E-03 56 0.013 81 0.021
7 5.4E-04 32 6.2E-03 57 0.013 82 0.021
8 6.8E-04 33 6.4E-03 58 0.014 83 0.022
9 8.4E-04 34 6.7E-03 59 0.014 84 0.022
10 1.0E-03 35 7.0E-03 60 0.014 85 0.022
11 1.2E-03 36 7.3E-03 61 0.015 86 0.023
12 1.4E-03 37 7.6E-03 62 0.015 87 0.023
13 1.6E-03 38 7.8E-03 63 0.015 88 0.023
14 1.8E-03 39 8.1E-03 64 0.016 89 0.024
15 2.0E-03 40 8.4E-03 65 0.016 90 0.024
16 2.2E-03 41 8.7E-03 66 0.016 91 0.024
17 2.4E-03 42 9.0E-03 67 0.017 92 0.024
18 2.6E-03 43 9.3E-03 68 0.017 93 0.025
19 2.8E-03 44 9.6E-03 69 0.017 94 0.025
20 3.1E-03 45 9.9E-03 70 0.018 95 0.025
21 3.3E-03 46 1.0E-02 71 0.018 96 0.026
22 3.6E-03 47 1.0E-02 72 0.018 97 0.026
23 3.8E-03 48 1.1E-02 73 0.018 98 0.026
24 4.1E-03 49 1.1E-02 74 0.019 99 0.027
25 4.3E-03 50 1.1E-02 75 0.019 100 0.027
aFor hourly dose rates < 1 mGy/h, Xj can be calculated based on Equation 5.
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indication is “life-threatening damage unlikely.” Should this same indi-
vidual work additional shifts that bring the cumulative normalize dose up
to a value of X = 0.75, then Hhem(X) would be ln(2)[0.75
6] which equals
0.12 (rounded). The RADHAZ indication would then be “life-threatening
damage likely.” Such a worker should not be expected to continue to work in the
gamma-ray field and would likely need some form of medical support. Normally a
worker would not accumulate a normalized dose as high as 0.75 in a given
year (due to the effective dose limit of 250 mSv) as is the case at the
Fukushima Daiichi facility. This is because exposure at the current
already raised annual effective dose limit of 250 mSv (or a somewhat
higher new limit) would guarantee that such a large normalized dose
would not occur.
Should medical support (i.e., medical countermeasures) with a PF=2
be given to a worker with X=0.75 before the medical support is provided,
then X would need to be reduced by a factor of 2, leading to X = 0.375. In
this case, Hhem(X) would be calculated to be 0 since X is below the thresh-
old lower bound of 0.4 (Table 1) for life-threatening damage. The RAD-
HAZ indication would then be modified to be “life-threatening damage
unlikely.”
An additional example involves one work shift for 10 hours when the
average equivalent gamma-ray dose rate to the bone marrow is 25 mSv/h.
In this case assuming uniform whole-body exposure the worker would
have received their current annual effective dose limit in the single work
shift. This is because a uniform whole-body dose of 250 mGy would also
represent an effective dose of 250 mSv, a consequence of the definition
of the effective dose (i.e., the dose which equates the cancer risk for the
actual exposure to the same risk had the total body been uniformly irra-
diated). The normalized dose X for 1-h exposure from Table 3 is 4.3x10-
3, which is below the threshold lower bound for life-threatening damage.
Assessing potential radiological harm
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TABLE 4. 10-hour shift normalize doses for serious damage to the hematopoietic system evaluated
for 10 consecutive work-shifts on 10 consecutive days (hypothetical results) 
Work Length Dose Dose rate 1-Hour 10-Hour 
Shift in hours (mGy) (mGy/h) Normalized Dose Normalized Dose
1 10 1 0.1 1.40E-05 1.4E-04
2 10 2 0.2 5.30E-05 5.3E-04
3 10 4 0.4 2.00E-04 2.0E-03
4 10 2 0.2 5.30E-05 5.3E-04
5 10 3 0.3 1.10E-04 1.1E-03
6 10 3 0.3 1.10E-04 1.1E-03
7 10 2 0.2 5.30E-05 5.3E-04
8 10 3 0.3 1.10E-04 1.1E-03
9 10 3 0.3 1.10E-04 1.1E-03
10 10 1 0.1 1.40E-05 1.4E-04
Total = 8.3E-03
9
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For a 10-h exposure it would be 10-fold larger at 4.3x10-2, which is also
below the threshold lower bound. The corresponding value for Hhem(X) is
therefore 0. The RADHAZ evaluation indication would be “life-threaten-
ing damage unlikely”. Thus, even with the raised annual effective dose
limit of 250 mSv, one would not expect any life-threatening damage to
bone marrow at the indicated limit. With an additional 9 such exposures
(same average equivalent dose rate), the value for X would increase to
0.43 and Hhem(X) would be expected to climb to 4.4x10
-3 and in which
case the RADHAZ indication would be “life-threatening damage possi-
ble”. With medical countermeasures applied and providing a PF of 2, the
value for X would decrease to 0.215 in which case the RADHAZ indica-
tion would again be “life-threatening damage unlikely.”
The above results relate to radiation deterministic effects. Radiogenic
cancer and reproductive effects are other possible risks that need to be
assessed for persons receiving moderate to high radiation doses.
However, a recent study revealed large thresholds for radiogenic cancer
(Tanooka 2011). The threshold also increases as dose rate decreases. For
low doses and dose rates, hormetic (beneficial) effects may occur for
doses up to and exceeding 250 mSv (Scott and Di Palma 2007) and are
expected to be orders of magnitude more likely than radiogenetic cancer
(Scott 2008). This may be especially relevant for down-wind populations
relative to the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, including persons residing
in Hawaii and on the West Coast of the United States. For a point of ref-
erence, each second of our lives we received more than 1 million natural
radiation hits to our body (Feinendegen et al. 2011). By age 20 (years),
the cumulative number of natural radiation hits each person receives
exceeds 630 trillion and there is no evidence of a positive association
between natural radiation exposure and cancer. In fact the reported asso-
ciations are negative (i.e., radiation hormesis) implicating likely benefit
rather than harm (Scott and Di Palma 2007).
Alarmists claiming that a single radiation hit to a citizen in the U.S.
from a stray radioactive atom coming across the Pacific Ocean from Japan
could cause cancer have no credibility. Even so, many persons across the
U.S. rushed to purchase potassium iodide tablets to supposedly protect
from phantom risks related to the Fukushima incident. Unfortunately,
side effects from potassium iodide are similar to symptoms from large
radiation doses (e.g., nausea, vomiting, darkened stools). Potassium
iodide can also cause an irregular heart beat. Thus, radiation phobia
related casualties (e.g., potassium-iodide-related) are far more likely than
any casualty directly related to radiation exposure from a stray radioactive
atom coming from Japan. Following the Chernobyl accident in 1986,
more than 100,000 wanted pregnancies were aborted at the advice of mis-
informed physicians (Ketchum 1987). Hopefully such a tragedy will not
be repeated in Japan and elsewhere as a result of the Fukushima Daiichi
B. R. Scott
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radiological situation.
The current framework for evaluating the potential health conse-
quences to down-wind populations of the Fukushima Daiichi plant is
based on the invalid linear-no-threshold (LNT) hypothesis: any amount of
radiation can cause cancer no matter how small. Very different implications
for managing the Fukushima emergency arise from the LNT hypothesis
and proven low-dose radiation hormesis (Scott 2011):
• Different choices of the evacuation zone radius around plant.
• Different policies about when to use bottle water.
• Different policies about when to ban use of radionuclide contaminat-
ed foods and milk.
• Different focus of news media reporting of the emergency (e.g., local
health risks [hormetic model] vs. global health risks [LNT hypothesis])
• Different ways of controlling radiation-phobia-related casualties (e.g.,
abortions, potassium-iodide-usage-related harm, stress-related psycho-
logical effects).
CONCLUSIONS
Recovery workers at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility that are
exposed to radiation doses up to the annual effective dose limit of 250 mSv
and somewhat beyond are not likely to have any life-threatening damage
to their bone marrow. Much higher doses would be expected to be need-
ed to pose a serious threat from radiation-induced deterministic effects to
the radiosensitive bone marrow. If a risk of harm exists, it would be expect-
ed to relate to possible cancer induction and/or reproductive effects. For
effective doses up to and somewhat exceeding 250 mSv, hormetic effects
are orders of magnitude more likely than cancer induction.
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